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NOTES
CONFLICT  MINERALS  AND  CRIMES  AGAINST
HUMANITY  IN  THE  DRC:  HOW  TO  HOLD




International criminal law is concerned with holding perpetrators
responsible for the gravest crimes committed by humanity.  The larger and
more heinous the crime, however, the more complicated the prosecution.
Identifying the relevant actors, producing sufficient evidence to impose lia-
bility, and bringing criminals to justice is a challenging endeavor.  This com-
plex process becomes even more daunting when factoring in complicit
actors.  This Note discusses the different legal mechanisms to hold individual
corporate officers criminally liable for complicity in committing crimes
against humanity and other human rights atrocities in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) as a result of their participation in the con-
flict mineral trade.  Part I provides an overview of the conflict in the DRC,
where rebel groups have profited off the conflict mineral trade for over a
decade, committing atrocious crimes against civilians in their wake, and then
addresses how corporations have contributed to the ongoing violence.  Next,
Part II defines the elements of crimes against humanity and analyzes how the
atrocities committed in the DRC satisfy them.  Then, Part III addresses the
three potential mechanisms of liability: accomplice liability, superior respon-
sibility, and joint criminal enterprise: category three (“JCE III”), by looking at
each mechanism’s elements and any differences between the different inter-
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2019; Bachelor of Arts in
Human Rights and Political Science, Honors, Southern Methodist University, 2014.  I
would like to thank Professor Jimmy Gurulé for his guidance and mentorship on this Note
and in life, as well as Professor Rick Halperin for igniting my passion to pursue justice.  I
would also like to thank my mother and grandparents for their endless love and support
and the staff of Notre Dame Law Review for their editing and friendship.  All errors are my
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national courts.  Finally, Part IV applies each of these legal mechanisms to
the actions of individual corporate officers in facilitating these crimes in the
DRC by way of financing the conflict mineral trade and analyzes whether or
not these actors could be liable for their actions.
Historical precedent supports holding individuals liable for interna-
tional crimes, and therefore individual corporate officers, not the corpora-
tion itself, would consequently be liable.  International criminal law imposes
duties and liabilities on individuals as well as states.1  In the Supreme Court
case Ex Parte Quirin,2 the defendants were charged with spying and sabotage
during World War II.  Chief Justice Stone, in his opinion for the Court, stated
that “[f]rom the very beginning of its history this Court has recognized and
applied the law of war as including that part of the law of nations which
prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy
nations as well as of enemy individuals.”3  International crimes are committed
by men, not abstract entities, and this theory of “individual responsibility”
harks back to the 1919 Treaty of Versailles.4  Under international law, gener-
ally, “any person may be tried for the commission of an international
crime.”5
Holding corporate officers criminally liable for crimes against humanity
can play an important role in compensating victims, punishing the actual
perpetrators, and deterring other corporations from engaging in similarly
criminal conduct.  Criminal accountability for corporations and their officers
when they are complicit in human rights abuses is a rare undertaking, but
with regard to gross human rights abuses, like crimes against humanity,
States have a duty to take measures consistent with international law to pre-
vent corporations located within their jurisdictions from committing human
rights abuses both within their territories and in others.6  Not only do States
have a duty to take measures, but international courts have duties to prose-
cute international crimes.
Corporations operating in war-torn countries, like the DRC, is not a new
phenomenon.  Businesses can maximize profits by purchasing raw materials
1 JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 39 (4th
ed. 2013).
2 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
3 Id. at 27–28 (emphasis added).
4 PAUST ET AL., supra note 1, at 40.
5 Id. at 43.
6 See, e.g., Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 16 (2013) on
State Obligations Regarding the Impact of the Business Sector on Children’s Rights,
¶¶ 42–44, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/16 (Apr. 17, 2013); Comm. on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of
States Parties Under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women, ¶ 36, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/28 (Dec. 16, 2010); Comm.
on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water, ¶¶ 23, 31,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003); Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Gen-
eral Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, ¶¶ 39, 51,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000).
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from countries at cheap prices and at the expense of human rights abuses
occurring in that State.7  Some corporations have become increasingly aware
of the effect that the conflict minerals trade has on propagating gross viola-
tions of human rights and have tried to clean up their supply chains.  How-
ever, other corporations, despite becoming aware of their use of conflict
minerals, have nevertheless refrained from taking steps to comply.  Without
any type of serious civil sanction or enforcement mechanism to force compa-
nies to stop using conflict minerals, international criminal law can fill the
gap.  This Note discusses the ways in which individual corporate officers
could be criminally liable by indirectly contributing to crimes against human-
ity committed in the DRC.
I. BACKGROUND: HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT MINERAL TRADE IN THE DRC
A. The DRC Conflict
Before discussing the ways in which individual corporate officers could
be liable for crimes against humanity, this Note must first describe the source
of why these atrocities are occurring: the conflict minerals trade.  Tin, tanta-
lum, tungsten, and gold—the four most prominent conflict minerals—are
used to make many consumer electronics, including cell phones and
laptops.8  In the mineral-rich eastern DRC, the extraction of these minerals
has created an outburst of various human rights abuses, fueling the conflict
between rebel groups and the Congolese army.9
Conflict has long been a part of the DRC’s history, beginning with the
Belgian colonial era,10 continuing after its independence in 1960,11 and
since the 1990s, when a deadly conflict erupted in the eastern DRC that was
partly the result of hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing the Rwandan
genocide.12  From the early 1990s, the conflict has not ceased; the DRC has
been referred to as the home of the world’s deadliest war since World War
7 Julia Graff, Note, Corporate War Criminals and the International Criminal Court: Blood
and Profits in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 23, 23 (2004).
8 Colin Fitzpatrick et al., Conflict Minerals in the Compute Sector: Estimating Extent of Tin,
Tantalum, Tungsten, and Gold Use in ICT Products, 49 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 974, 974 (2015).
9 See Rep. of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo (2012),
transmitted by Letter Dated 12 November 2012 from the Chairman of the Security Council
Comm. Established Pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic
Republic of the Congo Addressed to the President of the Security Council, ¶¶ 146–58,
U.N. Doc. S/2012/843 (Nov. 15, 2012) [hereinafter U.N. Final Report].
10 See, e.g., ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR,
AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA (1998).
11 See, e.g., JASON K. STEARNS, DANCING IN THE GLORY OF MONSTERS: THE COLLAPSE OF
THE CONGO AND THE GREAT WAR OF AFRICA (2011).
12 Louise Arimatsu, The Democratic Republic of the Congo 1993–2010, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 146, 148–49 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012).
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II,13 and as the deadliest conflict in all of Africa’s documented history.14
Despite a peace treaty technically ending the civil war in 2002,15 the human
rights abuses continue to rage on.  It is estimated that the conflict has led to
the deaths of over five million people.16  Furthermore, rebel groups, as well
as the Congolese army, share responsibility in these deaths and atrocities
committed, such as mass rape, systematic attacks on refugee camps, and
enlistment of child soldiers.17
Control over the conflict mineral mines in the eastern DRC has been a
“key factor” to propagating violence in the region.18  The international con-
flict mineral trade is a multimillion dollar industry.  In 2008 alone, tin, tanta-
lum, tungsten, and gold provided the armed groups with approximately $180
million in profits.19  Both rebel groups and Congolese army commanders
have controlled these mines, using the profits from smuggling the minerals
in and out of the country and selling the minerals to refineries and smelters
to finance the conflict.20  In addition to the human rights abuses committed
as a result of the conflict, the armed forces controlling the mines have also
imposed “excruciating labor conditions” on the miners and child laborers,
13 JOHN PRENDERGAST, CAN YOU HEAR CONGO NOW?: CELL PHONES, CONFLICT MINER-
ALS, AND THE WORST SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE WORLD 1 (2009), http://www.enoughproject
.org/files/publications/Can%20Your%20Hear%20Congo%20Now.pdf.
14 See INT’L RESCUE COMM., MORTALITY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO:
RESULTS FROM A NATIONWIDE SURVEY, at iii, http://www.kongo-kinshasa.de/dokumente/
ngo/IRC_DRC_Mortalit_Dec04.pdf (last visited Dec. 31, 2018).
15 LAURA DAVIS & PRISCILLA HAYNER, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, DIFFICULT
PEACE, LIMITED JUSTICE: TEN YEARS OF PEACEMAKING IN THE DRC 6 (2009), https://ictj.org/
sites/default/files/ICTJ-DRC-Difficult-Peace-2009-English.pdf.
16 STEARNS, supra note 11, at 4.
17 See U.N. Final Report, supra note 9, ¶ 147 (describing sexual violence by armed
groups); id. ¶ 148 (describing killing of civilians); id. ¶¶ 153–58 (describing recruitment
of child soldiers); Arimatsu, supra note 12, at 158 (recounting the shelling of refugee
camps).
18 The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Securing Peace in the Midst of Tragedy Before the
Subcomm. on Afr., Glob. Health, and Human Rights of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 112th
Cong. 9–10 (2011) (statement of Mr. Donald Yamamoto, Principal Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary, Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State) [hereinafter Yamamoto Testi-
mony] (“The illicit trade [in] minerals and other natural resources also encourages
violence, and the effective Congolese response and regional international responses by
governments and industries will be key to resolving these problems.”).
19 JOHN PRENDERGAST & NOEL ATAMA, EASTERN CONGO: AN ACTION PLAN TO END THE
WORLD’S DEADLIEST WAR 6 (2009), http://www.enoughproject.org/files/publications/east
ern_congo.pdf.
20 See Interim Rep. of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
transmitted by Letter Dated 21 May 21 2010 from the Chair of the Security Council Comm.
Established Pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic Republic of
the Congo Addressed to the President of the Security Council, ¶ 77, U.N. Doc. S/2010/
252 (May 25, 2010) (“In the Kivu provinces, it appears, almost every mining deposit is
controlled by an armed group.”); Remi Moncel, Cooperating Alone: The Global Reach of U.S.
Regulations on Conflict Minerals, 34 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 216, 221 (2016).
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harsh enough to result in death.21  Even though the DRC does not dominate
the global production of tin, tungsten, tantalum, and gold,22 the conflict
mineral trade has had a disproportionate impact on the magnitude of the
conflict.
B. How Corporations Are Involved
The minerals sourced from the DRC ultimately end up in a broad range
of electronic devices, including medical devices, industrial tools, jewelry, cell
phones, and laptops, produced by major electronic companies all over the
world.23  However, the supply chain tracing these minerals back to their
sources involves a complicated process.  For example, minerals are extracted
from the DRC, then sold to trading houses and other intermediaries in the
region, exported or smuggled to other countries with smelters to be melted,
exported again in their refined form to be manufactured and assembled into
the final products, when they are finally sold to international consumers.24
United States companies, concentrated in a few sectors, are major con-
sumers of the aforementioned minerals; however, U.S. regulations have sig-
nificant ripple effects on the global supply chain.25  For example, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) estimates that its regulations will
affect around 6000 U.S. and foreign companies.26  One specific piece of leg-
islation, section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, amended the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to address “the exploitation and trade of conflict min-
erals originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” which was
financing “conflict characterized by extreme levels of violence in the eastern
[DRC], particularly sexual- and gender-based violence, and contributing to
an emergency humanitarian situation therein.”27  This provision, imple-
mented in 2010, requires all publicly traded companies to exercise due dili-
gence in tracing their supply chains and report to the SEC any existence of
conflict minerals originating from the DRC or neighboring countries.28  This
provision does not explicitly ban or punish companies from using conflict
minerals, but rather it is intended to “foster public action” against their
use.29  For some companies, including Apple, HP, Intel, and SanDisk, this
21 Moncel, supra note 20, at 222; see, e.g., U.N. Final Report, supra note 9, at 170.
22 Moncel, supra note 20, at 223.
23 See id. at 222.
24 Id.; see also JOHN PRENDERGAST & SASHA LEZHNEV, FROM MINE TO MOBILE PHONE:
THE CONFLICT MINERALS SUPPLY CHAIN (2009).
25 Moncel, supra note 20, at 223.
26 JIM LOW ET AL., KPMG, CONFLICT MINERALS PROVISION OF DODD-FRANK: IMMEDIATE
IMPLICATIONS AND LONG-TERM OPPORTUNITIES FOR COMPANIES 2 (2011), https://institutes.
kpmg.us/content/dam/institutes/en/government/pdfs/2012/conflict-minerals-provi
sion-dodd-frank.pdf; Moncel, supra note 20, at 223–24.
27 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1502(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2213 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)
(2012)).
28 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13p-1 (2018).
29 Moncel, supra note 20, at 226.
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provision has incentivized them to become “conflict-free” and remove all
conflict minerals from their supply chains;30 however, other companies have
not submitted to public or governmental pressure to make such instrumental
changes.
To what extent can and should these companies, who have submitted
reports to the SEC via the Dodd-Frank Act, but not made attempts to clean
up their supply chains, be held liable?  The SEC has stated that companies
with conflict minerals in their supply chains have an obligation to disclose
“the facilities used to produce the conflict minerals, the country of origin of
the minerals and the efforts to determine the mine or location of origin.”31
Requiring companies to submit reports regarding their use of conflict miner-
als is a far cry from requiring companies to become conflict-free.  In 2014,
the first year that companies were required to submit reports, approximately
twenty percent of companies reported their supply chains as conflict-free,
while the other eighty percent said they were unable to make a final determi-
nation.32  Without a governmental enforcement procedure that punishes
corporations who refuse to eliminate the use of conflict minerals, what other
remedies are available?  This Note discusses how specific legal remedies in
international criminal law could enforce individual liability for corporate
officers engaging in the conflict mineral trade.
II. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
To assess whether or not individual corporate officers could be held
criminally liable, first this Note addresses the applicability of crimes against
humanity to the atrocities committed in the DRC.  Crimes against humanity
were first recognized as an international crime during the Nuremberg and
30 See Jay Celorie, HP’s Journey to a Conflict-Free Supply Chain, 3BL MEDIA (Aug. 11,
2014), https://3blmedia.com/News/HPs-Journey-Conflict-Free-Supply-Chain; Alex Hern,
Apple Plans to Cease Using Conflict Minerals, GUARDIAN (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.theguard
ian.com/technology/2014/feb/14/apple-conflict-minerals; Responsible Supply Chain, W.
DIG., https://www.westerndigital.com/company/corporate-sustainability/responsible-sup
ply-chain (last visited Dec. 22, 2018); Ariel Schwartz, Intel’s CEO Reveals The Company’s Plans
to Build a Conflict-Free Supply Chain by 2016, FAST COMPANY (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.fast
coexist.com/3034867/intels-ceo-reveals-the-companys-plans-tobuild-a-conflict-free-supply-
chain-by-2016.
31 Keith F. Higgins, Statement on the Effect of the Recent Court of Appeals Decision on the
Conflict Minerals Rule, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.sec
.gov/news/public-statement/2014-spch042914kfh.
32 Olga Usvyatsky, An Initial Look at Conflict Minerals & Dodd Frank Section 1502, AUDIT
ANALYTICS (June 23, 2014), https://www.auditanalytics.com/blog/an-initial-look-at-conflict
-minerals-dodd-frank-section-1502/.  In addition, the percentage proportions in 2015 were
roughly equivalent to 2014.  David Trilling, Conflict Minerals and Firms’ Ignorance Over Their
Supply Chains, BUS. ETHICS (Sept. 20, 2016), http://business-ethics.com/2016/09/20/
1237-conflict-minerals-and-firms-ignorance-over-their-supply-chains/.
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Tokyo trials following World War II.33  The International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR) ad hoc tribunals additionally codified crimes against
humanity as a category of offense,34 and Article 7 of the International Crimi-
nal Court Rome Statute (“ICC Rome Statute”) lays out the elements of
crimes against humanity.35  This Note evaluates the elements of crimes
against humanity as defined by the ICC Rome Statute for the purposes of
establishing whether or not these offenses occurred in the DRC, specifically
because the ICC opened up an investigation into the crimes in the DRC in
2002.
A. Elements
Article 7 of the ICC Rome Statute establishes four elements that must be
satisfied to prosecute a defendant for committing crimes against humanity:
(1) the commission of the crime as part of a “widespread or systematic
attack;”36 (2) against a civilian population;37 (3) with knowledge of the attack
directed against any civilian population;38 and (4) involving “a course of con-
duct involving the multiple commission of acts . . . against any civilian popu-
lation, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to
commit such attack.”39
Article 7(1)(a)–(k) goes on to list the crimes that, when committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack as directed against a civilian popula-
tion with knowledge of the attack, amount to crimes against humanity.40
The crimes include, but are not limited to, murder, extermination, enslave-
ment, forcible transfer of a population, imprisonment, torture, rape, perse-
cution, and other “inhumane acts” that cause great mental or physical
suffering.41
B. Application
In 2002 the DRC ratified the ICC Rome Statute, and since July 2002 the
court has exercised jurisdiction over crimes listed therein, allegedly commit-
33 See G.A. Res. 95(I), Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized
by the Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal (Dec. 11, 1946); J. Spiropoulos, Formulation of
Nürnberg Principles, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 181, 182, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/22.
34 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res.
827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (Mary 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8,
1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
35 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
36 Id. art. 7(1).
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. art. 7(2)(a).
40 Id. art. 7(1)(a)–(k).
41 Id.
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ted in the DRC by rebel forces or by its own armed forces.42  The ICC investi-
gations have focused on war crimes and crimes against humanity committed
in the eastern DRC, specifically the Ituri region, North Kivu, and South
Kivu.43  In June 2004, the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor issued a press
release acknowledging that “[s]tates, international organizations and non-
governmental organizations have reported thousands of deaths by mass mur-
der and summary execution in the DRC since 2002.  The reports allege a
pattern of rape, torture, forced displacement and the illegal use of child
soldiers.”44  The investigation has since revealed evidence of the following
specified crimes, committed by both the rebel and Congolese armed forces,
that fall under the category of crimes against humanity: murder and
attempted murder, torture, rape, sexual slavery, inhuman acts, persecution,
forcible transfer of population, attacking a civilian population, destroying
property, and pillaging.45  There are currently six open cases at the ICC and
two of those cases have led to convictions: Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo46 and Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga.47
While both Lubanga and Katanga were convicted of war crimes, Katanga
was also found guilty of one count of crimes against humanity: murder.48
Katanga, a former rebel leader in the DRC, was convicted of murder as a
crime against humanity for his part in a civilian massacre that occurred in the
Bogoro village in the eastern DRC.49  The massacre involved the killing of
over 200 civilians, with reports stating that around 173 of the victims were
under the age of eighteen.50  The conviction of Katanga for committing
crimes against humanity provides evidence that the atrocities committed in
the DRC satisfy the elements of crimes against humanity.  Even though
Katanga’s conviction is the only official conviction by the ICC for crimes
against humanity, the ongoing cases involve charges of crimes against
humanity as well.51  Outside of these trials, because control over the conflict
mineral mines in the eastern DRC has been a “key factor” to propagating
42 See generally Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo ICC-01/04, INT’L CRIMINAL
COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
43 See id.
44 See id. (quoting Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, The Office of the Prosecutor of




46 Prosecutor v. Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment (Mar. 14, 2012), https://www
.icc-cpi.int/pages/record.aspx?uri=1379838.
47 Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436, Judgment (Mar. 7, 2014), https://
www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_04025.pdf.
48 See id. at 658.
49 See DRC: All You Need to Know About the Historic Case Against Germain Katanga,
AMNESTY INT’L (Mar. 6, 2014), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/03/drc-all-
you-need-know-about-historic-case-against-germain-katanga/.
50 See id.
51 See Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo ICC-01/04, supra note 42.
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violence in the region,52 corporations could also be implicated in various
forms of complicit liability for these atrocities.
Individual corporate officers could be held criminally liable for viola-
tions of international criminal law, specifically crimes against humanity.
These violations include subjecting local populations, including children, to
forced labor in the extraction of minerals from the rebel-controlled and gov-
ernment-controlled mines; the torture, rape, and murder of thousands of
civilians as a consequence of both government and rebel armed groups fight-
ing to maintain control of these mines; and the destruction of agricultural
infrastructure forcing civilian farmers to work in slave-like conditions in the
mines.53  Corporations play an indirect but invaluable role in propagating
the atrocities in the DRC by ultimately funding the continuing economic suc-
cess of the mines controlled by rebel and military armed forces.  Even if the
crimes committed in the DRC implicating the corporate actors do not rise to
the level of crimes against humanity, the actors would still be liable for gross
human rights atrocities.  The next Part examines the legal mechanisms to
hold individual corporate officers liable for their complicity in these human
rights abuses.
III. SCOPE OF LIABILITY FOR INDIVIDUAL CORPORATE OFFICERS
Businesses are increasingly going global, adopting network-based operat-
ing models spread across multiple countries.  As a consequence, many corpo-
rations have a presence in countries where human rights abuses, including
crimes against humanity, occur.  The relationship between the corporation
and the state government, armed groups, and other businesses could there-
fore implicate them in these crimes.  There exists a global movement toward
holding these corporations and their individual officers liable for the human
rights abuses that occur.54  Businesses can implicate themselves in these
abuses both directly and indirectly by working with another actor responsible
for the direct perpetration.  This Note focuses on the legal theories that can
hold individual corporate officers liable for their indirect conduct.
International criminal law attributes guilt to individual officers and can-
not hold businesses accountable as a legal entity.55  The ICTY, ICTR, and
ICC Rome Statute all provide jurisdiction over natural persons.56  These enti-
ties state that an individual can be held responsible for “committing, plan-
52 Yamamoto Testimony, supra note 18, at 9–10 (“The illicit trade [in] minerals and
other natural resources also encourages violence, and the effective Congolese response
and regional international responses by governments and industries will be key to resolving
these problems.”).
53 Graff, supra note 7, at 25.
54 2 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, CORPORATE COMPLICITY & LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY: CRIMI-
NAL LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 58 (2008), https://www.icj.org/wp-content/up
loads/2012/06/Vol.2-Corporate-legal-accountability-thematic-report-2008.pdf.
55 Id. at 56.
56 See id.; see also ICTY Statute, supra note 34, art. 6, at 14; ICTR Statute, supra note 34,
art. 5, at 63; Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 25(1).
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ning, ordering, or instigating a crime or for otherwise aiding and abetting a
crime.”57  This Part provides an overview of three legal doctrines that could
apply to the indirect conduct of individual corporate officers: accomplice lia-
bility, superior responsibility, and JCE III.
A. Accomplice Liability
Since Nuremberg, the international community has held accomplices,
or individuals who aid and abet crimes, responsible under international crim-
inal law.58  International ad hoc tribunals and courts have incorporated
accomplice liability as well.  The ICTY and ICTR specifically impose individ-
ual criminal responsibility on an individual who “aided and abetted in the
planning, preparation or execution” of genocide, war crimes, or crimes
against humanity.59  The ICC Rome Statute imposes liability on an individual
who “aids, abets or otherwise assists” in the commission of genocide, war
crimes, or crimes against humanity.60  Aiding and abetting has two elements:
(1) the conduct of the person who aids and abets, and (2) the person’s
mental state.61
1. Actus Reus
The actus reus element of aiding and abetting is widely accepted by the
international community.  The Furundžija case decided by the ICTY Trial
Chamber summarized this element as an individual rendering “practical
assistance, encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect
on the perpetration of the crime.”62  Furthermore, the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) expert legal panel described that a company satisfies this ele-
ment if the company’s conduct has “enabled, exacerbated or facilitated” the
human rights abuses in question.63  Therefore, if a company enabled, exacer-
bated, or facilitated the commission of crimes against humanity, then its indi-
vidual officers could be held liable as aiders or abettors of the crime.
Article 25 of the ICC Rome Statute governs accomplice liability under
the ICC.64  To satisfy the actus reus of accomplice liability under the ICC, the
court provides that a person is individually responsible if he or she “aids,
abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission,
57 1 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 54, at 11 (footnotes omitted).
58 See Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in
the Courts, 6 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 304, 307 (2008).
59 ICTY Statute, supra note 34, art. 7(1), at 15; ICTR Statute, supra note 34, art. 6(1), at
63.
60 Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 25(3)(c).
61 Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 191, 235 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998).
62 Id. ¶ 235.
63 1 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, CORPORATE COMPLICITY & LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY: FAC-
ING THE FACTS AND CHARTING A LEGAL PATH 9 (2008), https://www.icj.org/wp-content/up
loads/2012/06/Vol.1-Corporate-legal-accountability-thematic-report-2008.pdf.
64 Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 25(3)(c).
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including providing the means for its commission”65 or “[i]n any other way
contributes” to a crime or an attempted crime by a group of persons acting
with a common purpose.66
2. Mens Rea
The more controversial element is the level of mens rea required for the
aider and abettor to possess.  Two tests have emerged regarding the degree
of mens rea that must be proved for accomplice liability: (1) the accomplice
had knowledge that his or her actions would facilitate the perpetration of the
crime (the “knowledge test”), and (2) whether it is necessary to prove the
intent of that individual to facilitate the crime (the “purpose test”).67
Under the “knowledge test,” the mens rea required of aiding and abet-
ting is knowledge that the acts performed by an individual assist in the com-
mission of the specific crime by the principal perpetrator.68  For specific
intent crimes like crimes against humanity, the aider and abettor must know
of the principal perpetrator’s specific intent.69  The knowledge is viewed
through an objective standard, and if the officer has the necessary knowledge
it is irrelevant that they only intended to carry out normal business
activities.70
Not all courts apply the “knowledge test,” instead requiring a higher
level of mens rea under the “purpose test,” which states that an individual will
be guilty if he or she aids, abets, or otherwise assists in the commission, or
attempted commission, of an act “for the purpose of facilitating” the commis-
sion of the crime.71  The ICC Rome Statute adopted the “purpose test” just a
few months before the ICTY in Furundžija adopted the “knowledge test.”72
Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute holds an individual criminally
responsible if he or she “[f]or the purpose of facilitating the commission of
65 Id.
66 Id. art. 25(3)(d).
67 See Cassel, supra note 58, at 304.
68 See Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgment, ¶ 102 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 25, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/vasiljevic/acjug/
en/val-aj040225e.pdf.
69 See Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Judgment, ¶ 127 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia May 9, 2007), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blagojevic_jokic/
acjug/en/blajok-jud070509.pdf; Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9-A, Judgment, ¶ 86
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 28, 2006), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
simic/acjug/en/061128.pdf; Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-99-46-A, Judgment,
¶ 370 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda July 7, 2006), http://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr
.org/files/case-documents/ictr-99-46/trial-judgements/en/060707.pdf.
70 See Blagojević, IT-02-60-A, Judgment, ¶ 127; Simic, Case No. IT-95-9-A, Judgment,
¶ 86; Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-99-46-A, Judgment, ¶ 370.
71 See Blagojević, IT-02-60-A, Judgment, ¶ 127; Simic; Case No. IT-95-9-A, Judgment,
¶ 86; Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-99-46-A, Judgment, ¶ 370.
72 Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 236 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/tjug/
en/fur-tj981210e.pdf.
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such a crime, aids, abets, or otherwise assists in its commission or its
attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission.”73
This heightened requirement for the individual to act with the purpose of
facilitating the crime does not supersede the “knowledge test” adopted by
previous courts.74  Furthermore, the ICC adopts a “knowledge test” with
respect to group crimes under Article 25(3)(d), requiring a group who aids
and abets to merely have knowledge that they are assisting in the criminal
activity.75
B. Superior Responsibility
The superior responsibility doctrine holds civilian superiors liable for
the criminal acts of their subordinates.76  Superior liability takes two forms.
First, direct or active superior responsibility occurs when the leader takes
active steps to bring about the crime, including conduct such as ordering his
subordinates to act unlawfully.77  Under the ICTY Statute, a superior who
engages in this conduct will be found to have “planned, instigated, ordered,
committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or
execution of a crime.”78  The second type of superior responsibility, which is
at issue in this Note, is indirect or passive superior responsibility.  Indirect
superior responsibility holds superiors liable for their “culpable omissions.”79
The ICC specifically imposes liability on civilian leaders who “knew, or con-
sciously disregarded information which clearly indicated” that their subordi-
nates were committing or going to commit crimes.80  Therefore, the doctrine
of superior responsibility establishes an affirmative duty that certain superior
officers have with regard to the conduct of their subordinates in order to
protect the civilian population from criminal harm.
Three elements have developed from the caselaw of the ICTY and ICTR
that must be satisfied in order for an individual to be convicted under indi-
rect or passive superior responsibility: (1) the superior had “effective control”
over his subordinate; (2) the superior “knew or had reason to know of his
subordinates’ crimes”; and (3) the superior “failed to take the necessary [and
reasonable] steps” to prevent the act or punish the perpetrator.81  The focus
of controversy regarding these elements has to do with the requisite mens rea
of “knew or had reason to know” and what is “effective control.”  In the end,
73 Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 25(3)(c).
74 Danielle Olson, Note, Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Violations Under Interna-
tional Criminal Law, 1 DEPAUL INT’L HUM. RTS. L.J. 1, 9, 11 (2015).
75 Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 25(3)(d).
76 See Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal
Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CALIF.
L. REV. 75, 120 (2005).
77 Id.
78 ICTY Statute, supra note 34, art. 7(1), at 15.
79 Danner & Martinez, supra note 76, at 120–21.
80 Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 28(b)(i).
81 Danner & Martinez, supra note 76, at 122.
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these terms amount to a question of fact, to be proven based on the evidence
of facts and circumstances in an individual case.
1. Mens Rea
The debate over the appropriate mens rea for a superior depends on
whether the superior must have knowledge of the crimes committed by his
subordinates or if he may still be liable for his subordinates’ conduct without
any actual knowledge.  The ICTY and ICTR state that the accused is liable
when he “knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to com-
mit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary
and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators
thereof.”82  These two tribunals, therefore, require a lower level of mens rea
than actual knowledge.
Determining the proper amount of liability, somewhere in between strict
liability and ordinary negligence, has been at issue in much of the ICTY and
ICTR caselaw.  In the ICTR Trial Chamber’s judgment in Akayesu,83 the
court said that superior responsibility should be based on, at minimum, neg-
ligence “so serious as to be tantamount to acquiescence or even malicious
intent.”84  The ICTY’s decision in the Čelebići camp case,85 decided shortly
after Akayesu, agreed with rejecting the basic negligence standard, stating
that requisite knowledge can be determined by proper evidence and that “a
superior is not permitted to remain wil[l]fully blind to the acts of his subordi-
nates.”86  However, the court also recognized that a superior is criminally
liable “only if some specific information was in fact available to him which
would provide notice of offences committed by his subordinates.”87 Čelebići
embraced a recklessness requirement, showing the superior had notice of
information that necessitated further investigation into the acts of his subor-
dinates if not conclusive proof of their crimes.88  Therefore, the standard, in
the ICTY and ICTR contexts, to satisfy mens rea is that information was avail-
able to put the superior on notice of the crimes being committed by his
subordinates.
In regard to civilian leaders, the ICC has a more stringent variation on
the ICTY and ICTR standard, imposing liability when they “knew, or con-
sciously disregarded information which clearly indicated” their subordinates
82 ICTY Statute, supra note 34, art. 7(3), at 15 (emphasis added); ICTR Statute, supra
note 34, art. 6(3), at 63 (emphasis added).
83 See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998), http://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/
ictr-96-4/trial-judgements/en/980902.pdf.
84 Id. ¶ 489.
85 Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the For-
mer Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/981116_judg
_en.pdf.
86 Id. ¶ 387.
87 Id. ¶ 393.
88 See id.; Danner & Martinez, supra note 76, at 127.
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were committing or were about to commit crimes.89  The ICC distinguishes
the mens rea required for civilian leaders from military leaders, the latter
only requiring a “knew or . . . should have known”90 negligence standard,
and the former requiring knowledge or “conscious[ ] disregard[ ].”91  Many
scholars believe the differing standards are inconsistent with customary inter-
national law, believing that all superiors should be held to the same stan-
dard92 and that the negligence standard for military leaders is too loose.93
However, other scholars are not as quick to pass judgment on the meaning of
“conscious disregard,” noting that little caselaw exists applying the doctrine
of superior responsibility to civilian superiors.94  Additionally, hybrid tribu-
nals established after the ICC Rome Statute came into effect have adopted
the “effective control” and “knew or had reason to know” standards, and not
explicitly distinguishing between military and civilian superiors.95
2. Effective Control
The element of “effective control” centers around the relationship
between superiors and their subordinates.  The current standard, established
by Čelebići, defines “effective control” as the material ability to prevent and
punish offenses.96  Civilian leaders can be considered superiors under the
doctrine of superior responsibility.97  The superior-subordinate relationship
to show “effective control” raises difficulty in the evidentiary context.  For
example, in Čelebići, two civilian defendants were acquitted of superior
responsibility charges because of a lack of proof to establish “effective con-
89 Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 28(b)(i).
90 Id. at art 28(a)(i).
91 Id. at art. 28(b)(i).
92 See GUÉNAËL METTRAUX, THE LAW OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 101 (2009) (“Under
customary law, the state of mind that must be proved is the same for all categories of
superiors.”).
93 See id. at 26–27.
94 See James D. Levine II, The Doctrine of Command Responsibility and Its Application to
Superior Civilian Leadership: Does the International Criminal Court Have the Correct Standard?,
193 MIL. L. REV. 52, 83–84 (2007); Greg R. Vetter, Command Responsibility of Non-Military
Superiors in the International Criminal Court (ICC), 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 89, 110 (2000).
95 See, e.g., Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 6 ¶ 3, S.C. Res. 1315, U.N.
Doc. S/Res/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/scsl-statute.pdf; Law
on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, art. 29,
No. NS/RKM/1004/006, (Oct. 27, 2004) (Cambodia), https://perma.cc/R4FD-LN3B.
96 Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, ¶ 197 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-
aj010220.pdf.
97 See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 195–96; Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgment,
¶ 76 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/
cases/aleksovski/acjug/en/ale-asj000324e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-
13-A, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 148 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Jan. 27, 2000), http://
unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-96-13/trial-judgements/en/
000127.pdf.
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trol” of their subordinates at the Čelebići prison camp.98  Defendant Delalić
was acquitted because the court failed to prove he exercised de facto or de
jure control over the camp,99 even though he coordinated the Bosnian Mus-
lim and Bosnian Croat forces in the area.100  Defendant Delalić was also
acquitted because the prosecutor failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that he was within the chain of superior at the Čelebići camp or that he
exercised “superior control” over subordinates.101
The ICC Rome Statute also distinguishes civilian superior responsibility
separately from military superior responsibility.  Article 28(b) states that, in
regard to nonmilitary superior and subordinate relationships, “a superior
shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court
committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control,
as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such subordi-
nates.”102  The ICC, therefore, recognizes that a superior can exercise “effec-
tive control” over a subordinate without existing in a government or military
hierarchy.103  In the end, establishing that a superior has “effective control”
in order to impose liability is intended to limit the scope of potential defend-
ants to those with the requisite culpability.
C. JCE III
Joint criminal enterprise (JCE) is one of the most complex and contro-
versial theories of liability.  The ICTY and ICTR statutes do not explicitly
define JCE; rather it has largely been a product of judicial interpretation and
caselaw in the Yugoslav Tribunal.104  The ICTY outlined the definition of JCE
in the Tadić case, where the Appeals Chamber faced the question of whether
the defendant could be liable for the murder of five men when he did not
personally kill them but the armed group to which he belonged did.105  The
Appeals Chamber concluded that there are three types of joint criminal
enterprise liability.106  The first two categories deal with liability for crimes
that fall within the “common design,” however, this Note focuses on the
third, most far-reaching category of JCE that involves criminal acts that fall
outside the common design (JCE III).107
98 Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 721, 810 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/
981116_judg_en.pdf.
99 Id. ¶¶ 720–21.
100 Id. ¶¶ 4–5.
101 Id. ¶ 810.
102 Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 28(b).
103 Id.  Article 28 applies the “effective control” test to both military and civilian
superiors.
104 Danner & Martinez, supra note 76, at 103–04.
105 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 183 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj
990715e.pdf.
106 See id. ¶ 195.
107 Danner & Martinez, supra note 76, at 106.
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1. Actus Reus
Like the first category of JCE, JCE III requires (1) a plurality of persons,
(2) the establishment of a joint criminal enterprise, and (3) the accused’s
knowing and intended participation in the joint criminal enterprise.108  The
first element, plurality of persons, requires at least two persons to be involved
in the criminal act.109  The persons need not be organized in a military, polit-
ical, or administrative structure—a spontaneous group gathered together to
commit a crime is sufficient.110  The second element, the establishment of a
joint criminal enterprise or common plan, comes into existence through an
agreement between a group of persons to commit a crime or crimes, and it
can be inferred through circumstances.111  Some circumstances to consider
would be the widespread or systematic nature of the crimes indicating the
existence of an agreement or plan to execute,112 the existence of a state or
regional policy,113 or a coordinated cooperation between both groups.114
To show the third element of participation, the Tadić Appeals Chamber
stated that, in order for the prosecution to prove that the defendant
intended to, and did, in fact, contribute to a criminal plan, one or more
participants need to have committed crime(s) that, while being outside the
shared intent of the participants, were nevertheless a “natural and foresee-
able consequence of the effecting of that common purpose.”115  The follow-
ing acts are examples of indicators that the crimes were “natural and
foreseeable” consequences: the crimes occurred frequently in effort to effec-
tuate the common purpose;116 the common purpose was executed under
circumstances that invited and provoked further violence, such as the vulner-
able conditions of persons or the presence of military.117
2. Mens Rea
JCE III allows for natural and foreseeable crimes to impute liability on
an individual on the condition that the individual was subjectively aware of
the “predictable consequence of the execution of the common design” but
108 Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, ¶¶ 204, 220, 227.
109 Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 435 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/tjug/en/stak-tj0307
31e.pdf.
110 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 611 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/tjug/en/krs-tj0108
02e.pdf; Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, ¶¶ 196, 227.
111 See Verena Haan, The Development of the Concept of Joint Criminal Enterprise at the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 167, 180 (2005).
112 See Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, ¶ 612; Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, ¶¶ 619–20.
113 Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, ¶ 471.
114 Id. ¶ 364, 478.
115 Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, ¶ 204.
116 Id.
117 Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, ¶ 616.
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was nevertheless “reckless or indifferent to that risk.”118  The Appeals Cham-
ber convicted Tadić of the murder of the five men, considered a crime
against humanity, under this JCE III theory of liability,119 however more
recent judgments have unanimously required adverted recklessness or dolus
eventualis.120  Adverted recklessness is an individual’s awareness that a crime
is a possible or most likely consequence in the execution of the enterprise
but nevertheless he or she participates in the enterprise.121
Since its inception, JCE III responsibility has received significant criti-
cism.  First, many national criminal justice systems do not have liability for
crimes committed outside the scope of the common objective.122  Second,
some critics suggest that individuals should not be held guilty for a crime
committed that the individual did not commit, intend, or know would
occur.123  However, others view JCE III responsibility as less problematic than
complicity crimes since the former requires the extra element of an “underly-
ing agreement or common purpose.”124  Third, proof of reasonable foresee-
ability does not solely depend on direct evidence but it can be based on
circumstantial evidence.125
In the Brdanin126 ICTY case, the court reaffirmed the elements of JCE
III, stating that it is proven “only if [1] the crime charged was a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the execution of that enterprise, and [2] the
accused was aware that such a crime was a possible consequence of the execu-
tion of that enterprise, and, with that awareness, participated in that enter-
prise.”127  The first element is objective; it does not depend on the state of
mind of the accused.  The second element is subjective; the prosecutor there-
fore must establish this state of mind in the accused.  The prosecutor, there-
fore, need only show adverted recklessness to the risk that the crime would
be a natural and foreseeable consequence.
IV. ANALYSIS OF LIABILITY
A. Accomplice Liability
The first mechanism to impose liability on individual corporate officers
for crimes against humanity committed in the DRC is accomplice liability.
118 Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, ¶ 204.
119 Id. ¶ 233.
120 See generally Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/tjug/en/
stak-tj030731e.pdf.
121 Id. ¶ 442.
122 See Danner & Martinez, supra note 76, at 109.
123 PAUST ET AL., supra note 1, at 81.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the For-
mer Yugoslavia Sept. 1, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tjug/en/brd-tj0409
01e.pdf.
127 Id. ¶ 265.
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This Section analyzes how the elements of accomplice liability established by
the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC would apply to the facts of this case.
1. ICTY and ICTR Elements
The ICTY and the ICTR impose accomplice liability on an individual
who “aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution” of crimes
against humanity.128  The ICTY defined the actus reus of this crime in the
Furundžija case, stating that an individual is liable for rendering “practical
assistance, encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect
on the perpetration of the crime.”129  In this scenario, an individual corpo-
rate officer would be held liable as an aider and abettor in crimes against
humanity if the company were found to have enabled, exacerbated, or facili-
tated the commission of the crimes.130  First, the “practical assistance” given
by a corporation to the armed groups in the DRC can be reduced to the
monetary benefit these groups obtain through the conflict mineral trade,
which directly perpetuates the continuation of atrocities in the region.  The
international conflict mineral trade is a multimillion-dollar industry through
which armed groups in the DRC profited $180 million in 2008 alone.131  The
indirect financing of these armed groups not only provides “practical assis-
tance” to maintaining the groups’ control of the region’s mines, but it also
encourages the groups to continue their current practices.132  The steady
cash flow, combined with the lack of any practical criminal repercussions,
“substantial[ly] effect[s] . . . the perpetration of the crime[s],”133 because
without it, there would be no monetary incentive to continue mining and
continue committing human rights atrocities.
The ICTY adopts the “knowledge test” requiring a person charged with
aiding and abetting a crime to have knowledge that his or her actions assist in
the commission of the crime committed by the principal perpetrator.134
Therefore, an individual corporate officer would need to know that the prin-
cipal perpetrators, the armed groups in the DRC, were going to commit
crimes against humanity.  Furthermore, because knowledge is viewed objec-
tively, if a corporate officer has knowledge of the crimes committed, it is
irrelevant that he or she only intended to carry out normal business activities,
128 ICTY Statute, supra note 34, art. 7(1), at 15; ICTR Statute, supra note 34, art. 6(1), at
63.
129 Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 191, 235 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/
tjug/en/fur-tj981210e.pdf.
130 2 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 63, at 21.
131 PRENDERGAST & ATAMA, supra note 19, at 6.
132 Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶ 235.
133 Id.
134 See Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgment, ¶ 102 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 25, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/vasiljevic/acjug/
en/val-aj040225e.pdf.
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including mining materials to produce electronic devices.135  Knowledge can
readily be established here by the numerous reports generated by human
rights organizations, the United Nations, and the ICC investigation of the
DRC that show the causal connection between the conflict minerals trade
and human rights atrocities occurring in the DRC for over a decade.136
Additionally, the 6000 companies affected by the Dodd-Frank legislation have
knowledge of the crimes occurring in the DRC as a result of the conflict
minerals trade.137  Because this legislation requires companies to exercise
due diligence in investigating whether or not conflict minerals are used in
the production of their electronic devices, and then submit reports on their
findings, a company therefore gives itself knowledge of its accomplice
liability.
2. ICC Elements
To satisfy the actus reus of accomplice liability under the ICC, Article 25
provides that a person is individually responsible if he or she “aids, abets, or
otherwise assists in its commission or attempted commission, including pro-
viding the means for its commission,”138 or “in any other way contributes” to
a crime or an attempted crime by a group of persons acting with a common
purpose.139  The inclusion of “providing means for [the crime’s] commis-
sion” could arguably cover the act of providing financial assistance by foster-
ing the conflict mineral trade.  An individual corporate officer working for a
company who manufactures electronics made with conflict minerals, there-
fore, “provid[es] the means” for armed groups to commit crimes against
humanity in exercising control over the mineral extraction and trade.
Whereas the ad hoc tribunals employ the “knowledge test” for mens rea,
the ICC has adopted the “purpose test.”140  The “purpose test” would only
impose liability on an individual corporate officer if he or she aids, abets, or
otherwise assists in the commission, or attempted commission, of the crimes
against humanity “for the purpose of facilitating” the commission of these
atrocities.141  This heightened mens rea requirement would be difficult to
establish because most companies involved in the conflict minerals trade do
not source conflict minerals with the purpose of facilitating human rights
abuses, absent evidence to show the contrary.  However, the ICC adopts the
“knowledge test” with respect to groups who aid and abet in the commission
of a criminal activity.142  A group of individual corporate officers could there-
fore be held liable under this variation of accomplice liability since the
135 2 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 63, at 21.
136 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo ICC-01/04, supra note 42; see U.N.
Final Report, supra note 9, ¶¶ 146–58; Moncel, supra note 20, at 220.
137 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012); LOW ET AL., supra note 26, at 2.
138 Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 25(3)(c).
139 Id. art. 25(3)(d).
140 2 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 54, at 21.
141 Id. at 22.
142 Rome Statute, supra note 35, at art. 25(3)(d).
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“knowledge test,” as demonstrated by the analysis with regard to the ad hoc
tribunals, is more easily satisfied.
B. Superior Responsibility
The second form of liability to consider is superior responsibility.
Human rights advocates and scholars have argued for a “duty of care” to be
applied to corporations and liability for individual officers engaging in
human rights abuses.143  Superior responsibility could, therefore, be a justifi-
able basis to hold corporations accountable.144  This Section analyzes how
the elements of superior responsibility established by the ad hoc tribunals
and the ICC would apply to the facts of this case.
1. ICTY and ICTR Elements
The Akayesu and Čelebići camp cases in the ICTR and ICTY, respectively,
embraced a recklessness standard of mens rea where a superior is criminally
liable “only if some specific information was in fact available to him which
would provide notice of offences committed by his subordinates.”145  There-
fore, if an individual corporate officer were put on notice of the crimes being
committed by his or her subordinates, then he or she would be criminally
liable.  In this case, notice of the crimes committed by rebel and military
groups in the eastern DRC due to the conflict mineral trade comes from two
sources: knowledge of the human rights abuses occurring in the eastern DRC
by published reports from the United Nations and the ICC,146 and knowl-
edge of conflict minerals in their supply chains via the published reports
required by the Dodd-Frank Act.147  Because companies are required to
report on their use of conflict minerals to the SEC, the companies are put-
ting themselves on notice of the use of the minerals and how the conflict
mineral trade directly influences the human rights atrocities taking place in
the DRC.
The second element of establishing effective control produces more dif-
ficulty in its application to individual corporate officer complicity.  The
Čelebići camp case provides the current standard that effective control is the
material ability to prevent and punish offenses.148  In that case, two of the
defendants were acquitted of charges under superior responsibility because
the prosecutor failed to establish that both defendants exercised de facto or
143 See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsi-
bility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 473 (2001).
144 See id.
145 Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 393 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/9811
16_judg_en.pdf.
146 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo ICC-01/04, supra note 42; see U.N.
Final Report, supra note 9, ¶ 170; Moncel, supra note 20, at 222.
147 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012); LOW ET AL., supra note 26, at 2.
148 Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-A, ¶ 197.
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de jure control over their respective subordinates.149  Here, a prosecutor
may find similar difficulty in showing that a corporate officer exercised a
material ability to prevent and punish the armed groups committing the
atrocities in the DRC in connection with the conflict mineral trade.  Because
the supply chain is a complex and convoluted network, the highest corporate
officers, even if they have notice of the crimes being committed, arguably do
not exercise control over the armed groups.  However, the indirect financing
of the atrocities via the conflict mineral trade could amount to de facto con-
trol of the armed groups since removing that financial backing would effec-
tively destroy the mining operation.  In fact, the driving purpose of the Dodd-
Frank Act was to help end the atrocities being committed in the DRC by
requiring companies to investigate and report on their uses of conflict miner-
als.150  Furthermore, even if the highest corporate officers cannot be held
liable, corporate officers further down the supply chain might act with effec-
tive control.
2. ICC Elements
Article 28(b) of the ICC Rome Statute governs civilian superiors under
the doctrine of superior responsibility.151  For a superior to be criminally
liable in the ICC, the prosecutor must prove that the superior “either knew,
or consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated, that the sub-
ordinates were committing or about to commit” a crime.152  This mens rea
requirement might be difficult to prove in this case because it requires show-
ing intent akin to willful blindness.153  However, knowledge of the conflict
mineral trade and the human rights abuses committed as a result of compa-
nies not cleaning up their supply chains is arguably common knowledge of
which a corporation claiming it did not know how its actions affect the DRC
conflict could amount to willful blindness.
First, knowledge of the human rights atrocities committed in the DRC is
widely available.  Since July 2002, the ICC has been investigating the crimes
committed in the DRC, reporting on the war crimes and crimes against
humanity that have taken place as a result of the conflict.154  The investiga-
tion has also led to two convictions, with one, former rebel leader Germain
Katanga, charged with crimes against humanity for a massacre of over 200
civilians.155  Second, knowledge of how the conflict mineral trade has
directly supported the human rights atrocities has been reported by various
human rights organizations and the United Nations.156  Furthermore, the
United States, in adopting the Dodd-Frank legislation, requires around 6000
149 Id. ¶¶ 720–21, 810.
150 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012); LOW ET AL., supra note 26, at 2.
151 Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 28(b).
152 Id. art. 28(b)(i).
153 Graff, supra note 7, at 25.
154 See Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo ICC-01/04, supra note 42.
155 See DRC: All You Need to Know, supra note 49.
156 See U.N. Final Report, supra note 9, ¶ 170; Moncel, supra note 20, at 222.
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U.S. and foreign companies to submit reports on the existence of conflict
minerals in their supply chains.157  In 2014, twenty percent of the companies
who submitted reports found no conflict minerals in their supply chains,158
and some major companies have committed to becoming conflict-free,
including Apple, HP, Intel, and SanDisk.159  Combining the common knowl-
edge of the DRC conflict with the explicit requirement of companies report-
ing on the existence of conflict minerals in their supply chains could amount
to knowledge that their subordinates, the workers along the supply chain
going all the way down to where the minerals are mined, are committing
crimes.  Even if this does not amount to actual knowledge, the existence of
this information and a company refusing to do anything to clean up its sup-
ply chain could amount to willful blindness.
If the prosecutor can establish the requisite knowledge to satisfy the
mens rea element of the crime, then he or she must establish that the indi-
vidual corporate officer had effective control over its subordinates.160  This
may be difficult to establish since it seems unlikely that a court would deem a
corporate officer of having effective control over “his or her rebel trading
partners or of fellow corporate actors with whom he or she designs and
implements criminal plans.”161  Thus, because of the complexity of a corpo-
ration’s supply chain, the lines establishing control between how the miner-
als get from the mines into the electronics eventually sold by these
corporations to consumers becomes attenuated.162  The companies resourc-
ing conflicts minerals from the DRC also do not have a relationship with the
government or rebel groups controlling the mines in so much that these
subordinates “are acting at the behest of the corporation” when the crimes
are committed.163  However, in connection with establishing knowledge of
the atrocities being committed, a prosecutor may be able to establish effec-
tive control by virtue of these organizations funding the commission of these
crimes.  If every corporation vowed to clean up its supply chain and rid itself
from the use of conflict minerals, the armed groups controlling the mines
would no longer make a profit, and without a profit, the mining operations
would cease to exist.  In the end, the argument that corporations maintain
effective control over the subordinate armed groups committing crimes
against humanity solely on the basis of their financial support may be too
attenuated to succeed, but relevant facts and circumstances of a particular
case might show enough de facto control to satisfy this element.
157 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012); LOW ET AL., supra note 26, at 2.




160 Rome Statute, supra note 35, art. 28(b).
161 Graff, supra note 7, at 25.
162 See supra notes 25–26.
163 Graff, supra note 7, at 25.
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C. JCE III
The third form of liability applicable to the conduct of individual corpo-
rate officers complicit in crimes against humanity occurring in the DRC is
JCE III.  JCE III holds individuals liable for criminal acts that fall outside the
criminal enterprise.164
1. Actus Reus
In order to show JCE III liability for individual corporate officers, the
prosecutor would need to show the existence of (1) a plurality of persons, (2)
the establishment of a joint criminal enterprise or common plan, and (3) the
accused’s knowing and intended participation in the joint criminal enter-
prise.165  The showing of a plurality of persons would not be difficult since
the conflict mineral trade involves multiple individuals at multiple levels
along the supply chain, and a single corporate officer is usually not responsi-
ble for making decisions on behalf of the corporation.  Furthermore, there
are multiple armed groups in the eastern DRC committing these atrocities in
connection with the conflict minerals trade.166  The persons need not be
organized in a military or administrative structure,167 but here both the
armed groups and corporate officers are organized in those structures
respectively.
More difficulty arises in trying to satisfy the second element of showing
the existence of a joint criminal enterprise or common plan between the
corporate officers and the armed groups committing the atrocities.  The joint
criminal enterprise or common plan would be a business relationship agree-
ment to enter into the smuggling and use of conflict minerals.  Because of
the complex, multistaged supply chain from armed groups extracting miner-
als from the mines to the corporations selling the final manufactured prod-
ucts,168 showing an actual agreement between the corporate officers at the
top and the armed groups at the bottom is highly unlikely.  However, an
agreement showing the existence of a common plan can be inferred through
circumstances.169  In this scenario, companies that are required to investigate
their supply chains under the Dodd-Frank Act and discover the use of con-
flict minerals in their products, but nevertheless continue to use these miner-
als, could be viewed as entering into an agreement with the armed groups to
continue the business relationship.  Therefore, the crimes against humanity
164 Dannier & Martinez, supra note 76, at 106.
165 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 204, 220, 227 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/
en/tad-aj990715e.pdf.
166 See Moncel, supra note 20, at 221.
167 Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, ¶ 227; see also Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T,
Judgment, ¶ 611 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001), http://www
.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/tjug/en/krs-tj010802e.pdf.
168 See Moncel, supra note 20, at 222; see also PRENDERGAST & LEZHNEV, supra note 24.
169 See Haan, supra note 111, at 180.
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and other atrocities that occur “outside” and as a result of this agreement
would fall under the application of JCE III.
2. Mens Rea
Even if the individual corporate officers did not participate in the atroci-
ties directly, JCE III would hold them liable for natural and foreseeable
crimes if they were subjectively aware of the “predictable consequence of the
execution of the common design.”170  This standard of adverted recklessness
would be shown if an individual corporate officer was aware that the atroci-
ties were a possible or most likely consequence in the execution of the enter-
prise (sourcing conflict minerals from the DRC) but nevertheless
participated in the enterprise.171  Corporate officers in companies that know-
ingly engage in the conflict mineral trade, therefore, would be liable.  The
conflict mineral trade has been a “key factor” in the propagation of violence
in the eastern DRC.172  A “natural and foreseeable consequence” to continu-
ing to source minerals from this conflict zone is the commission of crimes
against humanity and other atrocities by the armed groups that control the
mines.  Not only does continuing participation in the conflict mineral trade
objectively satisfy the mens rea requirement, but the adverted recklessness of
companies knowingly participating in the conflict mineral trade could
amount to subjective satisfaction.  The Dodd-Frank Act requires businesses to
investigate and report on whether or not conflict minerals are used in the
production of various electronics.173  Companies consequently put them-
selves on notice of whether or not they are involved in the conflict mineral
trade.  Therefore, if a company discovers it uses conflict minerals but then
refrains from cleaning up its supply chain, then its corporate officers could
be deemed reckless to the risk of crimes against humanity occurring as a
natural and foreseeable consequence to participating in the conflict mineral
trade.
CONCLUSION
Holding individual corporate officers criminally liable for their corpora-
tions’ complicity in human rights atrocities can help bring an end to the
crimes against humanity occurring in the DRC by eliminating the single-most
contributing factor to the violence: the conflict minerals trade.  The Dodd-
Frank Act has acted as a domestic, civil attempt to incentivize corporations to
170 Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, ¶ 204.
171 Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 442 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stakic/tjug/en/stak-tj0307
31e.pdf.
172 See Yamamoto Testimony, supra note 18, at 9–10 (“The illicit trade [in] minerals
and other natural resources also encourages violence, and the effective Congolese
response and regional international responses by governments and industries will be key to
resolving these problems.”).
173 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012); LOW ET AL., supra note 26, at 2.
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clean up their supply chains, and it has had moderate success with major
companies committing to becoming “conflict free.”  However, international
criminal law provides enforcement mechanisms that capture the conduct of
corporations who choose to continue sourcing their raw materials from con-
flict zones.
First, under accomplice liability, even if individual corporate officers
might not be liable under the ICC’s “purpose test,” under the “knowledge
test” adopted by the ad hoc tribunals these officers could most likely be liable
of aiding and abetting in the commission of crimes against humanity by pro-
viding monetary assistance to the armed groups committing the acts and hav-
ing knowledge that their assistance contributes toward the commission of
these crimes.  Accomplice liability might be the most easily satisfied because
of the lower mens rea required.
Second, the liability of individual corporate officers under the doctrine
of superior responsibility might reach different outcomes depending on
whether the crimes would be prosecuted under the ICC or a separate inter-
national court or tribunal that adopts the jurisprudence of the ICTY and
ICTR.  With respect the ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence, individual corpo-
rate officers would likely satisfy the “notice” requirement; however, establish-
ing “effective control” could be difficult due to the complex supply chain
network.  However, a court may find individual corporate officers to exercise
de facto control over the armed groups if providing financial assistance
amounts to the material ability to prevent the crimes, since removing profits
eliminates the value of the mines.  Under the ICC elements, the individual
corporate officers must be willfully blind to the armed group’s actions.  Com-
panies that investigate and report on their supply chains, under Dodd-Frank,
but continue to use conflict minerals could satisfy this willfully blind mental-
ity, however, the ICC would also require these officers to exercise “effective
control” over the armed groups, running into the same difficulties as the ad
hoc tribunal analysis.
Third, JCE III would impose liability on individual corporate officers if a
prosecutor could show the existence of a common plan or joint criminal
enterprise between the corporate officers and armed groups.  This element
may be difficult due to the attenuated connection between the armed groups
committing the atrocities and the officers, but the continuation of a business
enterprise in the conflict minerals trade could amount to an agreement.  If
the officers acted with averted recklessness toward the risk that crimes against
humanity and other atrocities would occur as a result of their continued
financing of the conflict mineral trade, that may be enough to show an
implicit agreement between the corporation and the armed groups.
Each of these doctrines under international criminal law could provide a
viable enforcement mechanism against individual corporate officers involved
in the conflict minerals trade in the DRC.  The degree of liability for a spe-
cific company’s corporate officers would depend on the evidence of facts and
circumstances that arise from an investigation, as well as whether or not the
individual corporate officers would be indicted by the ICC or a separate
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international court adopting the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals.
Reports by human rights organizations and the United Nations, in addition
to information available as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act, provide a founda-
tion of evidence for liability.  But in order for accountability to actually occur,
the ICC or another international court must administer their own investiga-
tions to determine the culpability of individual corporate officers under
these doctrines of international criminal law.
